.ycarcomed suoigiler ni seitrebil dna sthgir tnereffid gnicnalab fo yaw laicepse morf esira snoitcirtser eseht ,yaw rehtona tuP .smilsuM aihS fo ytirojam a htiw yteicos cimalsI na ot ralucitrap si hcihw ,ycarcomed fo mrof siht fo ytisoigiler eht morf etanigiro yllacigol taht seciffo pot dloh ot ytilibigile no snoitcirtser emos era ereht ,teY .tnemeveihca sti rof ' snaem lla ot derrefsnart ylirassecen si dne na fo ytilibisualp eht roF .tem eb dluohs seriuqer ycarcomed suoigiler evitatneserper fo noitasilaer eht revetahw ,ylsuoivbO .noitaicossa lacitilop fo modeerf ot thgir eht dna ,hceeps lacitilop fo modeerf ot thgir eht ,snoitcele cilbup dna tneuqerf ,eerf ot thgir eht sa hcus ,sthgir lacitilop emos seriuqer ycarcomed suoigiler evitatneserper fo noitasilaer eht taht suoivbo si tI .ycarcomed suoigiler ni 'ycarcomed ' fo tpecnoc eht morf evired yeht ,sthgir lacitilop eht rof sA

Security Rights- As for security rights, they derive from the idea of ' cooperati veness of social life' and relates to ' formal justice'. Tabatabai argues that human beings have entered social life, which should be conceived as being cooperative life, to more sufficiently meet their essential need to protection and security. According to Tabatabai, the essential need to protection gives rise to three basic rights as follows: the right to life, the right to protection against psychological and physical harm, and the right to hold private property. He argues that no human society can survive without these basic rights.

[١]

Therefore, a religious democratic society should guarantee for its citizens these basic security rights that derive from the main purpose of social life.

seitrebiL liviC

As for civil liberties, they derive from ' inconceiv ability of their negation', as well as from a recognition of individual ' autonomy', which is the necessary condition for their moral responsibility in God's sight. As for freedom of conscience and religion, again Tabatabai maintains that faith is the act of the intellect and heart that is susceptible only to rational reasoning and the like, rather than being the act of the body, which is potential for imposition. Consequently, not only is coercive imposition of religion on individuals inconceivable, but also the very act of imposition is morally forbidden in Islam.

[٢]

In advocacy of freedom of conscience and religion, Tabatabai goes so far as to argue that this case of

[١] -،-- ،!. ٣٣.، ٥

[٢] -،-- ،!. ٣٤٧.، ٢.