زندگى تحت توفيقات اصول اخلاق - مكارم شيرازى، ناصر - الصفحة ٣٨ - Studying and criticism

true for division of principles of good ethics into four. ٢- Including wisdom among principles of moral virtues, andits opposite point among the vices is not very appropriate, because moral habits are along the perception system and dealwith desires, affections and instincts, not with perceptions, andso interpreting braininess as" good morality" does not seemappropriate.

٣- Insisting that all good moral habits are moderatio nbetween two extremes is baseless, because although this is truein some cases but it is untrue in the other cases.

For example, considering tolerance of oppression as the highextreme for justice is not suitable, because high extreme is notapplicable to justice. If tolerance of oppression means indolenceand numbness, it will be the opposite side of chastity, and if itmeans fearing of adjudication, it will be low extreme of angerpower, and anyway high extreme in justice is meaningless, specially when justice is considered as anger and desire powersbeing controlled by intellect. It is a certainty that high extremein this control is senseless.

It is concluded that although moderation of good moralhabits is true in the cases like bravery and chastity, but it is nota generalization and is untrue in the case of justice and wisdom.

It is also inferred from above discussions that dividing principles of good and bad attributes into four principles has noclear reason, and even is objectionable in different aspects.

Therefore, it is better not to restrict principles of moralvirtues to four. Rather, we have good and bad moral attributesas many as different instincts, desires and affections entrustedin man, and training and balancing each of these instincts anddesires for being useful and effective for individual's and