ductive period of Shiism in Najaf. In addition, his policy of pursuing the communitys social and educational welfare around the globe, by means of the religious offerings of wealthy Shiite donors, earned him enormous respect and popularity as the marja al-taqlid. Although he had distanced himself from the political activism of Ayatol‌lah al-Sadr, he provided sponsorship and funding for Bint al-Hudas social work and educatiOnal projects for women in Najaf. Al-Khui recognized the contribution Bint al-Huda was making through her regular journal articles and her lectures among women. It was not customary for anyone in al-Khuis position to endorse the activ‌ist vision of the Muslim woman, such as that of Bint al-Huda, who represented the legitimate demands of the religiously oriented women in society.٢٤
In the ١٩٨٠s, practical considerations prompted lay and religious leaders among al-Khuis Persian and Arab followers in Europe and North America to establish the Al-Khoei Benevolent Foundation in order to supervise the large number of religious endowments and other tangible and intangible assets that were, until that time, man‌ aged by al-Khuis personal representatives.٢٥ The trustees of the foundation, who were personally appointed by al-Khui, included highly successful businessmen. They expanded the mandate of the foundation, registered as a not-for-profit corporation, by empowering the board to solicit, raise, accept, administer, invest, and reinvest the religious funds, and handle other properties. Hence, the Al-Khoei Benevolent Foun‌dation has expanded its activities in many parts of the world and has successfully established centers and schools in London and New York. It has also engaged in humanitarian activities that include feeding Afghani war victims and digging wells in East Africa, as well as voicing concerns at U.N. sessions in regard to human rights violations against the Shiites in Iraq.
Al-Khuis death left the Shiite community with an evident vacuum in religious leadership. Until ١٩٧٩, a set process for acknowledging religious leadership was in operation among the Shiites. With the emergence of the Islamic Republic of Iran, following the revolution in that year, the acknowledgment of Shiite leadership has become intertwined with the endorsement of the Iranian government.
Since the death of al-Khui, the question of the religious leadership under the lead‌ ing ayatollahs has flared up more than once. The deaths of such senior members of the Shiite religious establishment as Ayatollah Gulpaygani (d.١٩٩٣) and Ayatollah Araki (d. ١٩٩٤), following the death of al-Khui in ١٩٩٢, have left the community with several prominent candidates from among the succeeding generation of schol‌ars-mostly among al-Khuis disciples-whose leadership, primarily for political reasons, remains to be accredited by both lay and religious experts who represent various interest groups in the worldwide Shiite community. To be sure, the question is critical in the apparent absence of a consensus in regard to which leading authority in the Shiite community should adorn "the mantle of the Prophet."
The traditionally recognized criteria for determining the qualifications of a mujtahid who could assume the position of the marja al-taqlid are dominated by the conservative spirit of the Shiite centers of religious learning in Qumm and Najaf. There is an ostensible lack of vision in this spirit for the future of the widely dis‌persed Shiite community. Moreover, the conservative spirit is the main reason that the religious centers have not been able to produce a set of objective criteria and a