cession" and "substitution" (tanasukh) of the inheritances and the epochs. In addi‌ tion, it signifies "elimination" and "removal" (izala), and it conveys the sense of "cancellation" and "repeal" as its usage in the sentence "The sun canceled the shadow" indicates. This latter sense of the term was much in vogue in the language of the early Companions and their successors. Hence, they used to apply the term al-nasikh (the abrogator) to all the general injunctions on which a particularization or restriction was imposed, because the particularization and the restriction caused the earlier gen‌ eral application to be "repealed."١

AI-Naskh in Its Technical Usage

Technically, the termnaskh signifies the abolition of an ordained matter in the Sharia because of the passage of its period [of applicability], regardless of whether this abolished matter is related to the divinely ordained injunctions or to noncanonical laws; or whether it is related to the divinely ordained positions or other matters that revert to God, because of His being the Lawgiver. The latter signification of the term is the way it is seen in the case of an abrogation of only the recitation of a verse.
Nevertheless, we have restricted the abolition to matters ordained in the Sharia so as to exclude situations in which the injunctions are terminated because their ex‌ ternal conditions have ended. Thus, for instance, the obligation to fast ends with the end of the month of Ramaqan; the obligation of performing the daily worship elapses with the passing of the appointed time of that worship; ownership of ones goods ends with ones death. This type of termination of an ordinance may not be called naskh because only the condition of an injunction has elapsed, and not the injunc‌ tion itself. Moreover, according to Muslim scholars, there is no objection to its pos‌ sibility or to its actual occurrence.
For further clarification of this issue, it is important to state that in the divine Sharia the law is applicable in two different ways.
First, the law is applicable in the realm of legislation and promulgation. The law at this stage is created in the form of a positive legal case. In its applicability, there is no difference whether the subject matter exists externally or whether it does not exist. The basis of the legal decision is the hypothetical existence of the subject. Hence, when the Lawgiver says, "Partaking of wine is forbidden,"for instance, it does not mean that the wine exists externally and that such a wine is ruled as forbidden. Rather, the meaning is that when the existence of wine is hypothetically conceived in the external sense, then it is ruled as forbidden in the Sharia regardless of whether the wine actually exists in the external sense or not. Accordingly, the annulment of the ruling at this stage cannot take place except through abrogation (naskh) of the ruling.
Second, the law is applicable externally, in the sense that the law becomes effec‌ tive because of the actual externality of the subject matter. For example, if wine ac‌ tually exists externally, the unlawfulness of wine in the Sharia becomes applicable to this wine in actuality. This applicability continues as long as its subject continues to exist. However, if the wine changes to vinegar, the prohibition that applied effec‌ tively to the wine would now cease to apply to the vinegar. But the termination of this ruling is not abrogation at all, nor has anyone raised a question as to whether it