is or is not. The question arises only in the first stage, that is, in the realm of legisla‌
tion and promulgation.

Possibility of Abrogation

The prevailing position among rational Muslims and others is the permissibility of abrogation in the sense that is open to dispute, namely, abolition of the legal ruling regarding its subject matter in the realm of legislation and promulgation. The Jews and Christians disagreed with this and claimed that abrogation is impossible, sup‌ porting their argument on [the basis of] an error which is weaker than a spiders web.
The summary of [the statement of] this error is as follows:
Abrogation supposes the lack of wisdom on the part of the abrogator, or his igno‌ rance of some aspects of wisdom. Both suppositions are impossible [in the light] of God, the Exalted. This is so because the legislation of a ruling by the Wise and Abso‌ lute God is necessarily in accordance with the exigency that requires it. Moreover, an unplanned ruling is contrary to the wisdom that enacted it. Hence, rescinding a law which had been instituted for [the importance of] its subject matter can mean one of two things: either that the exigency of the law remains with the knowledge of the abrogator (and this would contradict the wisdom of the legislator, despite the fact that He is the Absolute, Wise); or that this is because of the alteration of divine pre‌ ordination (bada ),and the discovery of the contrariety about that, as with man-made rulings and laws (and this necessitates ignorance on the part of God). Accordingly, the occurrence of abrogation in the Sharia is impossible, because it presupposes that which is impossible.
The response [to this is as follows]. An established ruling by the Wise One may be intended as an instigation or a prohibition in the real sense. A case in point would be the commands which are intended as a test. It is possible to establish these kinds of ordinances and then abolish them, and there is no objection to that, because both the establishment and the abolition arose from the exigency and wisdom of the mo‌ ment. This kind of abrogation does not postulate a lack of wisdom in the Lawgivers judgment. Moreover, from the occurrence of alteration does not spring that which is impossible in the case of Gods actions. On the other hand, the instituted ordinance may be a real one; nevertheless, it gets abrogated after a while. This does not mean that the ruling, after being instituted, is rescinded with regard to the same conditions and the same matter (which is what would make it impossible of the All-Wise, who knows what comes to pass). Rather, it means that the instituted ordinance is limited to a specific time known to God but unknown to people, and that its termination is after the end of that time, because the term to which it is limited is over, and the end to which it is linked has been reached.
[Clearly], abrogation in this sense is definitely possible. That a time specification is one of the things on which laws are conditioned is something no rational person can doubt. Thus, Saturday in the Mosaic law, for example, has a special significance that makes it necessary to consecrate it, of all other days, a day of rest for those who follow that law. Such is the case with Friday in Islam, as well as with the times for the prayers, the fast, and the annual pilgrimage, al-l:zajj. If it is conceivable that such