they are not capable. Another possible meaning is that the term refers to all the signs, and this is also erroneous, for the confirmation of a prophets veracity could be achieved by any divine sign. It does not require all the signs. Besides, those who demanded the signs did not ask him to produce all of them; hence, there is no point in ascribing this meaning to the verse. Evidently, the prohibited signs mentioned in this verse are certain divine miracles that are known.
Second, if the denial expressed by the doubtful were a good reason to prevent the sending of divine signs, it would have, likewise, been a good reason to prevent the sending of the Quran as well, for there is no sense in excepting the Quran, of all di‌ vine signs, from this obstruction. We have already explained that the Quran is the most important miracle brought by any prophet, and that the Prophet Mui).amrnad (peace be upon him) challenged all the communities with it in order to prove his prophethood as long as there remain days and nights. This also conveys to us that the prohibited signs were only a particular kind of signs, and not divine signs in general.
Third, the verse states that the reason for not sending the divine signs was that
such signs were denied to the earlier communities. This amounts to explaining the absence of a thing by the presence of an obstacle. It is evident that a justification based on the existence of an obstacle is not rationally acceptable except if the cause necessitating the existence of that thing is present. An intelligent person, for example, would find it inappropriate to explain that a piece of wood is not damp, when the fact is that there is no fire around it to make it bum. This is self-evident, and is not open to doubt. Therefore, to justify the absence of divine signs on the ground of the denials, it would be imperative that something existed that required sending them. The thing which required sending them could have been the divine wisdom of guid‌ ing human beings and leading them toward their happiness. In this case, the peoples request for signs from the Prophet must have exceeded the number required to pro‌ vide the proof [of his claim to divine office]. However, if divine wisdom were the thing that required sending signs, then they would have inevitably been sent. This is because nothing can prevent divine wisdom from effecting what it wants, because it is unthinkable that the All-Wise would choose to do something that would contra‌ dict His wisdom, regardless of the existence or nonexistence of denial. Besides, if the denials of past communities were admissible as an obstacle preventing divine wisdom from sending the signs, they would have also been admissible as obstacles to sending the Prophet. This and its opposite premises are necessarily false, and a contradiction of what is obligatory. Hence, it remains that the thing requiring the signs to be sent is the demand of the people. Those who demand divine signs inevitably require things that exceed the [number of] signs necessary for establishing the proof. This is to say that it is incumbent on God to send whatever signs are necessary to establish the proof, but any signs in excess of those must not be sent by God, neither of His own accord nor in compliance with the demand of the doubters. It is true, however, that it would not be impossible for Him to do that if circumstances deemed it necessary to establish the proof a second or a third time, or if it were necessary to respond to what the people demanded.
Accordingly, the demand for signs must have been made by some people after the proof had been established for them with the necessary signs, and after they had denied them. Moreover, denials by past communities were the reasons for not send-