However, the situation in Iraq, following the success of the Iranian revolution in ١٩٧٨-٧٩, deteriorated quickly, bringing large numbers of Shiites into the streets of the major cities of Iraq. This was known as the intifada (uprising) of the Shiites in Iraq, which no ayatollah, however politically quietist, could afford to ignore. The campaign of repression against the Shiites reached its height when, following his house arrest on June ١٢, ١٩٧٩, the Ayatollah al-Sadr issued a fatwa declaring that it was obligatory for Muslims to engage in a jihad against the godless Bath Party.١٥ A number of prominent religious leaders were executed and some were expelled in July
١٩٧٩. The political turmoil turned into violent demonstrations under the Shiite leaders of the Islamic movements who constantly sought al-Sadrs directive in dealing with the regime. The climax was reached when al-Sadr, writing during his house arrest, explicitly required the Shiites to take radical steps in order to redress their condition in Iraq:

In the present situation, Islam needs not reform, but revolution. The reformative calls that built religious schools and published books are now peripheral, although they served a good purpose.١٦ The main battle that Islam is fighting now is against its (Bathist) enemies.... The only way to change the propaganda (run by the government-controlled education and media) is to change the rulers.١٧

The political turmoil that followed this call for an all-out jihad against the regime ended in the imprisonment and swift execution of Ayatollah al-Sadr and his sister, Bint al-Huda, on AprilS, ١٩٨٠. There is very little information about al-Khuis reac: tion to these grim developments. However, the Shiite activists who were expelled to Iran and Syria in the aftermath of al-Sadr s execution were strongly critical of his quietist stance in the face of Shiite repression by Saddam Husseins forces, which continued into the ١٩٨٠s. The systematic repression of themujtahids and other leaders that was carried out by Saddam left little doubt that nothing could prevent him from completely annihilating the Shiite establishment by executing its major benefactor, al-Khui, especially if al-Khui, under immense pressure from the revolutionary leaders in Iraq, issued a similar fatwa to revolt against the unjust government of Iraq. Cir‌ cumstantial evidence suggests that Iraqi authorities were just waiting for such an opportunity to get rid of al-Khui, as they had done with the other prominent and influential leaders in Najaf and Karbala.
Following the execution of Ayatollah al-Sadr, al-Khui asked for permission to leave Iraq. But he was denied an exit permit and all the religious donations that were in his care, amounting to some two million dollars, were confiscated by the Iraqi govemment. ١٨ His communication with the outside world was severed and his sm‌ dents were arrested, while some others were executed, along with his teaching assis‌ tants and administrative staff. This treatment, despite his avoidance of politics and his advanced age, was a great blow to al-Khuis leadership, and it diminished his ability, in his position as the marja al-taqlid, to act as the patrbn to and benefactor
of seminarians and lay members of the community.
The ١٩٧٨-٧٩ revolution was followed by the Iranian-Iraqi war which lasted from
١٩٨٠ to ١٩٨٨. During this war, the conditions remained most unfavorable for al-Khui, with his large following on both sides. He and other politically quietist mujtahids٩ were frequently criticized by Iranian officials for downplaying the political aspect