a. God, the Almighty, has required of a witness that he be just and acceptable, as He says, "Such as you approve as witnesses" (Q. ٢:٢٨٢); "and call to witness two just men among you" (Q. ٦٥:٢). A nonbeliever, however, is neither just nor acceptable. As such, [they say], the injunction regarding the permission of accepting the testi‌ mony of a nonbeliever must be regarded as [having been] abrogated.
The response [to this is as follows]. The first verse [Q. ٢:٢٨٢] is revealed in the
context of a debt, and the second [Q. ٦٥:٢] is revealed in the context of a divorce. Accordingly, there is no argument to support their applicability in the case of a last will and testament. Furthermore, even if it were to be admitted that these two verses are general in application, it remains that the previous verse was meant to set a restric‌ tion on them; and the general [application] does not abrogate the restriction on it‌ more particularly, when the restriction is chronologically subsequent to it, as is the case here.
b. There is a consensus that the testimony of a sinful person (fasiq) cannot be admit‌
ted. A nonbeliever is a transgressor; hence, his testimony cannot be admitted.
The response [to this is as follows]. There is no meaning in reverting to the con‌ sensus when the majority of scholars are of the opinion that the testimony of a non‌ believer is permissible. This was established in the foregoing, and there is no ratio‌ nal congruity between the rejection of the testimony of a sinful Muslim and the rejection of the testimony of a nonbeliever who is morally sound in his religion.
c. The testimony of a nonbeliever is not admissible for Muslims except in matters re‌ lated to a testament, and there is a disagreement on whether it is admissible even in cases of a testament. Consequently, the matter over which there is a dispute must be referred [for a decision] to the matter over which there is a consensus.
The response [to this is as follows]. This argument is extremely strange in the light of the evidence that the testimony in the matter of the will is admitted without any objection. The person who holtls this view should have reversed his statement to say that the testimony of a nonbeliever in the will was acceptable during the Prophets time, as established by a consensus, and the dispute occurred only after that period. Hence the dispute in this matter should be referred to that on which there is a consensus.

Consequently, there is nothing to support the claim that the verse was abrogated except the acceptance by a group of later jurists of the opinion to that effect. How can one relinquish an injunction that is stated in the Quran on the strength of a legal decision made by one of the people contrary to it? More confounding is the opinion, maintained by al-I:Iasan [al-Ba ri]
two others from among others than you" (٥:١٠٦) is "two others from another tribe." Hence, they conclude, there is no evidence in the verse that the testimony of nonbe‌ lievers is admissible. ١١٣
That which refutes such an opinion, in addition to the traditions related in con‌ nection with the interpretation of the verse, is the very fact that it is contrary to the apparent text of the Quran. This is because the verse is certainly addressed to the believers, and, accordingly, when God says, "Others than you" it necessarily means other than the believers-that is, the nonbelievers.
To be sure, the general sense of the verse indicates the acceptance of the testi‌ mony of nonbelievers in the matter of the last will, even if they were not from the people of the Book, and regardless of whether Muslim witnesses were available or