of the leadership of a mujtahid under the doctrine of "the governance of the jurist" that was being consolidated through the constitutional process in Iran.
The end of the Iran-Iraq war (in ١٩٨٨) afforded some respite from the state-run
atrocities against the Shiite population. In August ١٩٩٠, Kuwait was invaded with no apparent justification under any pretext in the Islamic law. There is no concrete infor‌mation available, for the early part of that crisis, as to how Saddam sought religious justification by pressuring the Shiite or Sunni leaders of Iraq. We certainly know, however, that al-Khui declared illegal all transactions involving stolen goods from Kuwait that were being sold in the markets in Iraq.٢٠ This was an indirect way of say‌ ing that the invasion of Kuwait was an unjust war against fellow Muslims and, accord‌ingly, that the spoils of war could not be regarded as lawful for possession or sale.
Saddam Husseins defeat in the Gulf War in ١٩٩١ by the American-led coalition
put al-Khui under extraordinary pressure to comply with Saddams orders to put down the Shiite insurrection and to legitimize his political ventures, including the invasion of Kuwait. In the aftermath of the war, the policy of the Iraqi government was to control all the Shiite activities in the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala in order to subvert the Shiite cultures protest against the repressive authority. In early March
١٩٩١, Saddams power was faced with a severe internal revolt orchestrated by Iran,
the U.S. government, and some of its Arab allies. Saddams political survival was indeed in question. Najaf, Karbala, and other Shiite towns in the south experienced unrest, and there were clearly signs that people intended to overthrow Saddam. At the peak of the uprising, when Najaf appeared to be consolidating under the Shiite leaders, al-Khui sanctioned the establishment of a "Supreme Committee" of nine people who would oversee Iraqs security and try to stabilize political and social affairs. The committees role was limited to governing Shiite affairs; in no way did al-Khui envision "the governance of the jurists" that was formalized in Iran. ٢١ On March ٢١, ١٩٩١, Saddam resorted to his repressive tactics. He forced al-Khui to appear on national television and asked him to appeal to the Shiites to end their insurrection. Such a statement from the marja al-taqlid was primarily intended to undermine Shiite confidence in their already weakened leadership. Additionally, it was supposed to send a signal to the ShTite movements who were trying to over‌ throw Saddam, telling them that they could not count on the backing of the most senior religious leadership to legitimize their insurrection. Undoubtedly, al-KhtiIs appear‌ ance with Saddam was a public humiliation of the Shiite religious leadership. The insurrection that had been encouraged by the United States was ruthlessly crushed, while the international coalition looked the other way, allowing Saddam to exact his vengeance on his own civilians.٢٢ The Iraqi forces loyal to Saddam pounded Najaf and Karbala with artillery and tank fire, killing hundreds of people, destroying homes, gardens, mosques, and Shiite shrines.٢٣

The Crisis of Leadership in the Aftermath of al-Khuis Death

Al-Khuis death on August ٨, ١٩٩٢, marked the end of an era in the history of Najaf and of Shiite leadership of the marja al-taqlid. Indeed, for more than half a century, al-Khuis leadership had represented a politically moderate, intellectually pro-