able to perceive, through his innate disposition, that, although he is free to do or not to do certain things, most of the rudiments of these actions are, in many cases, out‌ side his choice. This is because among the rudiments of performing an act is the exis‌ tence of the human being, his perception of the act, his desire for it, the appropriate‌ ness of the act for one of his capacities, and his ability to perform it. It is clear that these kinds of rudiments are beyond human free will, and the one who creates these things in human beings is the Creator of the human being himself.
It has been established in its proper place that the Creator of these elements in
mankind did not detach Himself from His creatures after the creation, and that the survival of created things and their continuity need its mover at every moment. The relationship of the Creator to the things He creates is not the same as the relation between the mason and a wall he has built. The wall thereafter does not need its builder. It will remain even if he dies. Nor does it resemble an author whom the book needs until it has been written, but does not need in the stages of its survival and continuation. Rather, the relationship of the Creator, "to whom belongs the loftiest likeness" [Q. ١٦:٦٠], to the things created resembles the effect of electrical power on light. Undoubtedly, the light does not turn on except when it is connected with an electric current, and it will remain in need for this supply of power at all times. But if its wire is disconnected from its source of power for any period of time, the light will be extinguished for that period of time, as if it never existed. Thus do all things and all existents draw on their First Creator for their existence, as long as they exist. They are ever in need of His support, bound to His mercy, which "embraces all things" [Q. ٧:١٥٦]. Accordingly, human actions fall in between free will and predetermina‌ tion; yet this power and all other elements during the act are conferred by God. Hence, in one respect, the action depends on the human being, and in another, it depends on God. The verses of the Quran point to this sense, and a persons freedom to act does not hinder the effect of Gods power and authority. We shall give here an example that approximates what we said and would clarify the principle of the "proposition [that is] between the two propositions," which Imams of the Imamite Shiites have proclaimed, and to which the Quran has alluded.
Let us imagine a person with a paralyzed hand that he cannot move by himself. However, a,.physician is able to give it temporary willful movement by means of electrical power, so that the person is able to move his hand by himself when the physician connects it to an electrical current. But if he is separated from the source of power, he is unable to move it at all. Thus, if the physician were to connect the current as an experiment, and if the sick man began to move his hand and use it in his actions, and if, further, the physician continued to provide him with power all the time, this would be a clear example of the "proposition between the two proposi‌ tions" [of complete freedom and complete predetermination]. [In other words], the movements of the hand cannot be attributed to the man independently, because he is dependent on the supply of power provided by the physician. Nor can that be attrib‌ uted independently to the physician, because the movements have proceeded from the man of his own will.
Accordingly, the doer is not compelled in his actions, for he himself had willed them; nor are the actions fully delegated to him, because the means come from some‌ one else. All actions that are freely chosen by the doer are of this type. The action