an engineer says, "I have in my mind a picture of a building that I will draw on a chart." Or a believer says, "It is in my mind that I fast tomorrow."
Third, it is appropriate to apply the term "speaker" to God. The form here is a verbal noun used to indicate the presence of a principle [of speech] in the divine essence, but only in a. predicative sense. It is for this reason that the attributes in-:‌ volved in moving, standing still, or sleeping are applied only to the O!le performing these functions, and not to the one who created them. Itis evident that it is not pos‌ sible for uttered speech to be attributed to God, for it is not possible for the Eternal to be characterized by a created attribute. Consequently, it is inevitable that the speech of God will be regarded as eternal so as to describe God as the Speaker, by virtue of the characterization of Him with that term.
The response [to this is as follows]. The principle involved in the use of the term
"speaker" (mutakallim) is not the speech, because it does not subsist in the speaker the way an attribute subsists in the thing characterized by it. This is true even in the case of beings other than God. After all, speech is an accidental property for the voice which results from the vibration of the air. As such, it subsists in air and not in the speaker. The principle involved in the application of the word in this situation is the "speaking" (takallum). It does not make sense to understand [this in any sense] other than the sense of causing speech to occur. Hence, itcarries the same meaning whether applied to God or to any other being.
As for the claim of one who says that "the verbal noun is used to indicate the pres‌
ence of a principle [of speech] in the divine essence, in the same way that an attribute subsists in the one to whom it is ascribed," this is a manifest error. The reason is that the form indicates only some kind of subsistence of the principle [of speech] in the divine essence. As for the specific characteristics of this subsistence-and whether they constitute a form of existence, dwelling within somebody, or some other form‌ these characteristics cannot be determined from the purport of the form, for they change according to the context. Hence, they do not come under one general rule. The terms al- alim (knower) and al-naim (sleeper), for instance, are not applied to the originator of knowledge and sleep, whereas the terms al-qabig(withholder), al‌ basit (bestower), al-nafi (beneficent one), al-gar (causer of hurt) are applied to the originator of the conditions. Accordingly, the incorrectness of applying the term "moving" to the originator of motion does not necessitate the incorrectness of ap‌ plying the term "speaker" to the originator of speech.
To conclude, the thesis about the speech of the soul is merely a speculative matter that does not have a basis for supporting its existence, whether rationally or demon‌ stratively. It is appropriate that we end this section by quoting the Imam al- adiq
this subject. The report has been related by al-Kulayni through a transmission going
back to AbU Ba Ir,

I heard Aba Abd Allah [al-Sadiq] say: "God, our Lord, the Almighty and Glorified, has never ceased to exist. Knowledge was His essence before there was anything to be known. Hearing was His essence before there was anything to be heard. Seeing was His essence before there was anything to be seen. Power was His essence before there was anything over which to exercise power. When He created things and knowable things came into being, His knowledge embraced all that is knowable; His hearing, all that can be heard; His sight, all that can be seen; and His power, all that can be subject