ingly, there is no basis for the opinion that a command is designated to express a demand; nor is there any basis for saying that a quest is a "mental speech" that is indicated by the "uttered speech."
The Asharites are correct in their view that al-talab means something other than al-iradi:l (will). Nevertheless, they are certainly wrong in regarding it as a mental characteristic, and in considering that it is indicated by the Uttered speech.

Refutation of the Thesis about the Speech of the Soul

In light of the above discussion, it is obvious that there is nothing in the instances of the declarative or creative sentences that might be considered a kind of speech inherent in the mind, and that might be called a "speech of the soul." True, it is necessary for the speaker to conceive of his speech before bringing it into being. The act of conceiving a thing is its creation in the mind, in what is called "mental existence" (wujad dhihnT). If this is what the Asharites mean by a speech of the soul,-then it is correct. However, we have shown that this is not peculiar to speech only; it covers all voluntary acts. The speech should be understood in this vein because it is a voluntary act of the speaker.

Asharite Arguments in Support of the Thesis about the Speech of the Soul

The following are some of the arguments advanced by those who claim the existence of the speech of the soul.
First, all speakers conceive the speech mentally before speaking. That which exists
externally in the form of a speech is actually an indicator of a similar thing existing in the mind. This mental speech is detected by every person in his mind. It is to this that al-Akhtal [the Arab-Christian poet of the Umayyad court] alludes:

Surely the speech [of a person] is in the heart, and the tongue is made to evince that which is in the l•P-١It.٣
The answer, as has already been noted, is that the formation of the speech in the mind is its conception and its presence there. It is the mental existence that applies to all voluntary actions. A writer or a painter, [e.g.], must first conceive of his objects before he creates them. This mental process has no relation to the speech of the soul.
Second, one can apply the label "speech" to that part of it that exists in the mind.
This application is sound without any need to prove it. Thus, a person says, "I have in my mind words that I wish not to reveal." Moreover, God, the Exalted, says: "Be se‌cret in your speech, or proclaim it; He knows the thoughts within the breasts"(Q.٦٧:١٣).
The answer to this is again apparent from what was noted above. Speech can be such in its mental existence just as it is in its external form. For everything there are two forms of existence-external and mental-and a thing is the same thing in both forms of its existence. The thing is named without any attention to this conformity between the two forms. However, this situation is not peculiar to speech only. Thus,