This is further supported by our knowledge of numerous traditions, related on the authority of the Imams, ihat particularize the general meanings of the Quran and restrict its absolute injunctions. If particularization or restriction by a single narra‌ tion were in contradiCtion of the Quran, then the Imams would not have spoken correctly when they said, "That which contradicts our Lords statement would not have been said by us. It is either vain or erroneous." In the light of tbis statement it is evident that particularizing or restricting a general sense does not involve a contra‌ diction of the Quran.
Furthermore, the Imams established that if one of two contradictory traditions were
in harmony with the Quran, that would weigh in favor of it against the other. In other words, the one contradicting it-that is, the one that does not agree with the general sense of the Quran-would have been evidence in itself had it not been contradicted by the other tradition. Therefore, it is evident that such a tradition; if its disagree‌ ment with the Quran were so great that it would be impossible to attain harmony between the two, then it would no longer be proof in itself, nor would there be any point in countering it with the other tradition and establishing the latters preponder‌ ance. Consequently, it is inevitable that the purport of its disagreement with the Quran is that it is possible to harmonize the two conventionally on the basis of particulariz‌ ing or restricting the general meaning of the Quranic revelation.
To conclude, the tradition that functions as a particularizer for the Quran, or a restricter for it, is evidentiary in itself and hence must be abided by except if it is tested by a contradicting tradition.

٣. They maintain that if it is permissible to particularize the Quran through a single narration, then it would also be permissible to abrogate it by the same means. Since abrogation by means of such a tradition is definitely not permissible, it follows that particularization by means of it is also not permissible. The evidence in support of this correlation is that abrogation, as discussed in chapter ١٠, is a form of particular‌ ization of the period [of applicability], and the evidence of the abrogator is provided by the clarification that the earlier ordinance was specifically limited to a period ter‌ minated by the appearance of the evidence provided by the abrogator. Abrogation therefore does not abolish the substance of an ordinance but simply sets it up for‌ mally and outwardly. Particularization with respect to persons is similar to time speci‌ fication-in both cases it is particularization, and, accordingly, if the first is permis‌ sible, so is the second.
The response [to this is as follows]. That which distinguishes the two kinds of particularization is the incontestable consensus regarding the prohibition of admit‌ ting a single narration as evidence of abrogation. Had it not been for this consensus, then it would have been permissible to admit abrogation by means of an evidentiary single narration, just as the particularization by it is permissible. We explained ear‌ lier that the Quran, although incontrovertible in the matter of its transmission, is not decisively clear in its meaning. There is no objection to resolving this latter aspect by means of a single narration whose evidentiary nature is established by means of absolute proof.
To be sure, the stated consensus is not a type that must be merely followed. Rather, it arises because certain things are of such a nature that if they occur externally, they