hand, it has been reported from al-J:Iusayn and the two Saduqs that a permanent marriage [to a scripture woman] is permitted. We shall treat the subject later in its appropriate place, God willing.

(١٠) There is no compulsion in religion. The right direction is henceforth distinct from error. (Q. ٢:٢٥٦)

A group of scholars maintains that the above passage has been abrogated by Gods saying, "٠ Prophet! Strive against the disbelievers and the hypocrites" (Q. ٩:٧٣).
Some of them maintain that the verse refers, in particular, to the People of the Book [Jews and Christians] since they could not be attacked because of their disbe‌ lief. This we noted earlier. The fact is that the verse is precise and has not been abro‌ gated, nor is it restrictive. This is so because the word ikrah (compulsion), appears in the dictionary with two meanings: first, "that which stands exactly opposite to assent." This is the sense in which the following revelation from God uses the word: "But it may happen that you hate (tukrihu) a thing which is good for you" (Q. ٢:٢١٦). Second, [it means] "that which stands exactly opposite to choice." This is the sense conveyed by Gods saying, "His mother bears him with pain (kurhan), and brings him forth with pain" (Q. ٤٦:١٥). The reason is that bearing a child and giving birth to it are tasks done willingly, but, at the same time, are beyond our willpower. The opinion that the verse has been abrogated, or that it is restricted, is contingent on the word ikrah being used in the first sense. However, this opinion [that it is used in the first sense] is incorrect because of the following reasons.
First, there is no evidence to support such a meaning. A word that carries two meanings may not be interpreted in terms of one of them, rather than the other, with‌ out the proper contextual evidence.
Second, the word "religion" (din) is broader in meaning than the term "funda‌ mental beliefs" (u$a[) and its derivatives (furu ). The mention of "disbelief" and "belief" following [the word "religion"] does not restrict the word "religion" to the fundamentals only. Common usage points to the application of the major proposi‌ tion to its minor one, in that understanding the fundamentals leads one to carry out the derivatives of religion. There is no doubt that justifiable ikrah (compulsion, coer‌ cion) was well established in the Sharia from the very beginning in accordance with the practice of rational beings. Numerous examples of this kind of compulsion can be provided. It includes compelling a man in debt to honor his debts, compelling a wife to obey her husband, compelling a thief to give up theft, and so on. How can one say, then, that there was no compulsion in the Islamic Sharia at any time?
Third, the second meaning of ikrah-namely, "that which stands exactly oppo‌
site to choice"-would not accord with Gods saying that "the right direction is hence‌ forth distinct from error" (Q. ٢:٢٥٦), except if the purport were to convey the reason for the injunction, and the fact that compulsion is not practiced because it is unnec‌ essary, considering the clarity of the right direction and its distinctness from error. If this is the purport of the verse, then it cannot have been abrogated, because the proof of Islam has been self-evident from the time it emerged. Its ascendancy, however, came about gradually. This means that compulsion was less likely to occur toward the end of the Prophets mission because Islam at that point was even more manifest,