were to establish a point in this regard; and if it were clearly general in application; and if, further, it clearly establisheed a ruling for the Muslim community and did not merely state that such a ruling existed in the Torah-in such a case the first verse would qualify [the second verses] generality, and serve as a clue to its purport. The general injunction does not qualify as an abrogator of a restricted injunction, even if it happens to be chronologically subsequent to it. On the contrary, restricted injunc‌ tions are clues for regulating the apparent meanings of the general injunctions, as is the case with restricted injunctions of a later period. It is for this reason that there is no ground to maintain that it is permissible to kill a freeman for killing a slave.
As for the tradition relatedon the authority of the Imam Ali, from the Prophet, in which he said, "The blood of each Muslim is on a par [with that of other.Muslims]," this tradition, assuming that it is sound, is qualified by the verse. This is because the intent of the report is the permission for a freeman to be killed for killing a slave, and hence it is general in application.
It is indisputable that the evidentiary worth of a general ruling is dependent upon the absence of any restriction being applied to it, whether preceding it or subsequent to it. However, as for the report narrated on the authority of the Prophet, through al‌ I:Iasan, who had received it from Samra, its chain of transmission is weak and, hence, cannot be regarded as trustworthy. According to AbU Bakr b. al-Arabi, "Undoubt‌ edly, ignorance has affected those who say that a freeman can be killed for killing his own slave, and who support their opinion by citing a tradition on the authority of al-f:Iasan, who related it on the authority of Samra. He said that the Prophet said: He who kills his slave, we shall kill him. This report is weak." ١٣
In addition to that, this tradition contradicts another tradition, related by Amr b. Shuayb on the authority of his father and his grandfather, regarding a man who inten‌ tionally killed his slave: The Prophet ordered him whipped and banished him for a year and struck out his share from the Muslim booty of war, but did not slay him in retaliation. ١٤ ١t [the report transmitted from Samra] is also contradicted by what has been reported by Ibn Abbas on the authority of the Prophet, and by Jabir from Amir, who reported on the authority of Ali, "A freeman cannot be killed for killing a slave";١٥ and by what Amr b. Shuayb related from his father on the authority of his grandfather: that Abu Bakr and Umar did not kill a freeman for having killed a slave. ١٦
It has already been stated above that the traditions related on the authority of ahl al-bayt are in agreement that a freeman can be killed for killing a slave. Indisput‌ ably, the ahl al-bayt are the authorities in matters of religion after their great fore‌ bear, the Prophet (peace be upon him and his family). Considering their view on the matter of killing, there remains no room for claiming the abrogation of the verse re‌ garding the killing of a freeman for killing a slave.
Furthermore, in relation to the killing of a man for killing a woman, the verse, according to the doctrine of the Imami Shiites, as well as of al-f:Iasan and Ata, has not been abrogated, either. But according to the opinion of Sunni scholars, it is.
The explanation of the Imams view is that the literal sense of Gods saying that "retaliation is prescribed for you" (Q. ٢:١٧٨) is that retaliation is an obligation and a duty. It is, moreover, evident that it becomes an obligation when retaliation is sought by the avenger of the blood. This matter is known apart from the verse and is proven by what God, the Exalted, says, "And, for him who is forgiven somewhat by his [in-