ous contradictory interpretations of the same passage. The traditions represented various political and theological trends in the community. The Sunnis accepted only those reports related on the authority of certain narrators who were regarded by them reliable; by contrast, the Shiites admitted only those who represented their own view‌ point. No opinion was accepted as an authoritative documentation for the specific exegetical opinion on the Quran if it did not meet the ideological-sectarian crite‌ rion. Consequently, in the history of the Quranic exegesis, the interpretation based on the traditions was most prone to factional considerations and prejudices.
Although al-Khui uses both Sunni and Shiite traditions to prove his points, he
mainly relies on the Sunni traditions to highlight the problems that surround their transmission and evidential value. Thus, for instance, in his detailed discussion about the problem of identifying abrogating and abrogated verses of the Quran with cer‌ tainty, he relies heavily on Sunni sources to refute Sunni claims of abrogation of particular verses on the basis of evidence provided by the traditions. The subject of abrogation also provides him with the opportunity to present the Shiite views de‌ rived from the very passages that were regarded by the Sunnis as being abrogated. Hence, al-Khui endeavors to prove that Sunni judicial decisions on critical issues in interhuman relationships that had to do with capital punishment, offensive warfare, the validity of a divorce based on a triple-repudiation, and the invalidity of tempo‌ rary marriage were derived from traditions that claim abrogation of the Quranic passages that deal with these matters. There is a fundamental methodological con‌ cern in al-Khuis criticism in this connection-namely, Can the tradition become the source of Quranic abrogation? The question has been debated among Muslim jurists because of its implication for the position of the Quran when compared with the traditions. Nevertheless, al-Khuis purpose in raising this theoretical question is, understandably, to demonstrate the validity of some rulings-for instance, on tem‌ porary marriage--derived from the so-called abrogated verses, after making a rigor‌ ous scholarly appraisal of the sources used as contrary evidence by the Sunni authors.

juridical Significance of the Exegesis

Al-Khui was essentially a jurisprudent. His interest in the Quran was in discover‌ ing, through the historical knowledge of the language of the Quran and those who spoke it, the relationship of the divine message to social exigencies and other human conditions. Although it is in large measure a work of history, there is an implicit admission in The Prolegomena that understanding the variations and disagreements among Muslim exegetes requires an understanding of the political and social forces that influenced their interpretations of the "occasions of revelation" (asbah al-nuzul). These interpretations, in tum, were motivated by the distinct positions on the creed that were held by the individual commentators engaged in reading specific creedal and juridical inquiries into the meaning of the Quran.
The best example is provided by al-Khuis treatment of the abrogation (naskh) of the verse which actually instituted temporary marriage (mut a) in the Quran. The inherently subjective nature of any historical enterprise is underscored as a major factor in al-Khuf s continual interest in unfolding the understandings of earlier com-