by their applicability and meaning. Consequently, the apparent meanings of the Quran, and its general and absolute injunctions, are all part of the exposition, though they are not all part of the fundamental tenets. Hence, it is not proper to act upon them, lest one might inadvertently act against their reality.
The response [to this is as follows]. This summary knowledge can hinder a per‌ son from adhering to the literal meanings of the Quran only if a person intends to act upon them without first examining the sense they convey. However, after seek‌ ing and obtaining the level of knowledge whose existence among the apparent mean‌ ings is already ascertained by the believer, the problem of summary knowledge is resolved. Consequently, it can by no means be regarded as summary knowledge, leaving the believer without any restriction of acting upon the apparent meanings of the Quran. The same applies to the sunna of the Prophet. There, we determine the qualifications imposed on the general ordinances, and the restrictions on the abso‌ lute ones. Thus, if the summary knowledge hinders a person from adhering to the literal sense of the Quran even when this problem of summary knowledge has been resolved, it would have to be a hindrance in acting upon the apparent meanings of the sunna. Indeed, it would hinder the implementation of the principle of exemption in the performance of ambiguous injunctions, whether they set down obligatory or forbidden acts. This is because all the believers know about the existence of obliga‌ tions in the sacred law. The corollary of this summary knowledge is the obligation of being cautious in implementing all the obscure injunctions, whether they pertain to prohibitions or obligations, though there may be no certainty that this caution is necessary. It is true that a number of traditionists have ruled that it is incumbent to act with caution in regard to obscure injunctions pertaining to prohibitions. This, however, is because they imagined that those traditions that order the believers to suspend judgment or to apply caution indicate that it is incumbent to be cautious or to withhold an opinion in regard to these ambiguous injunctions. Certainly, this opin‌ ion of theirs does not stem from their summary knowledge of the existence of re‌ quired obligations in the Sharia; otherwise, it would have been necessary for them to maintain that it was obligatory to apply precautionary measures even to ambigu‌ ous injunctions that pertain to obligations. However, we know of no one among them who has ruled thus. The reason that it is not necessary to exercise caution in this or other similar instances is that the problem of summary knowledge had been resolved with the acquisition of the possible level of information, and once it is resolved, it ceases to be effective. For further information on this subject, the reader is referred to our book on the principles of jurisprudence, entitled Ajwad al-Taqrfrlit.

٥. Prohibition to follow the ambiguous verses. The verses of the Quran forbid the believers to act upon the ambiguous ordinances, in accordance with what God, the Exalted, says: "It is He who sent down upon thee the Book wherein are clear (muf:zkamat) revelations-they are the substance of the Book-and others [which are] ambiguous (mutashabihi:it). But those in whose hearts is doubt pursue, forsooth, that which is ambiguous, seeking [to cause] dissension by seeking to explain it ..." (Q. ٣:٧). The ambiguous verses, they maintain, include the apparent meaning; indeed, the least that can be said about them is that they include the literal meanings of the Quran. Thus, the evidential nature of the apparent dimension of the Quran cannot be maintained.