cordingly, its evidential character is not derived from the evidential character of the
smaller of the two esteemed things.
The reason that the Quran ceases to be the proof when its alteration is assumed is the possibility that the literal meanings of the Quran have a context [which is pre‌ sumably omitted], and which points to the opposite of this apparent mearang. In this case it is not acceptable to rely on the [principle that states that the] fundamentality of the absence of the context [is applicable] because [certain words or phrases] have been omitted. The proof based on this principle is derived from the rational argu‌ ment that one should follow the literal sense, and should not be concerned with the possibility of the context being inconsistent with it. We explained, in our work on the fundamentals of jurisprudence, that the established measure of rational principles, no matter how small, dictates that rational persons not be concerned about the exis‌ tence of a separate context, nor about a connected context when the reason for the probability is the neglect on the part of the speaker to explain, or on the part of the listener to be informed. As for the probability of the existence of the connected con‌ text apart from these two reasons, the rational persons have suspended judgment about following the apparent sense of the passage. The following example illustrates this case. A person receives a letter from someone he must obey, in which he is ordered to buy a house. But he finds that part of the letter is destroyed, and thinks it probable that the destroyed part contained the specifications of the house he was required to purchase, as to its size, price, or location. The rational persons would not adhere to the general tone of the existing letter, relying on the fundamentality of the absence of the connected context, and would not purchase any house as a fulfilment of the order of the person who sent the letter, nor would they regard the one who carries out such a command as having obeyed the instructions of the master.
The readers doubts may go further than this, and he may say that this view under‌
mines the foundation of the science of jurisprudence, and the deduction of juridical decisions. The reason for saying this is that the most important documentary evidence [for the deduction of juridical decisions] is found in the traditions transmitted from the infallible Imams (peace be upon them), and it is likely that their words and phrases have connected contexts that have not reached us. [In that case how could one trust these reports in deriving legal injunctions?] However, a little careful analysis of the situation would remove this illusion. This is because the fundamental principle in the matter of reporting, when the connected context does not exist, is the apparent narra‌ tion of the reporter, for it is incumbent upon him to explain such a context if the state‌ ment of the infallible Imam had one. The probability that the reporter might have ne‌ glected to mention this context cannot be taken into consideration.
Certainly, the belief in alteration means that adherence to the literal meanings of the Quran is not permitted. And, in order to prove this conclusion, there is no need to assert comprehensive knowledge about the inconsistency of the apparent sense in some verses, so as to respond to this conclusion by maintaining that the occurrence of alteration in the Quran is not in need of such knowledge as a general principle. Moreover, this overall knowledge cannot be implemented, because some"aspects of it are not part of the verses that contain injunctions, and accordingly, it is of no con‌ sequence in the matter of performing [legally ordained duties]. However, the com-