Table of Contents
- Editor’s Foreword p ٧
- Shaykh Ishraq and the Problem of Mental Existence / Fatima Husseini Mujarrad and Reza Akbariyan p ١١
- The Imagination Faculty and Imaginative Perception in Ibn Sina and Suhrawardi / Meytham Razmgir and Sayyid Muhammad Intezam p ٢٧
- Investigating the Problem of Universals in Ibn Sina’s View and Its Interpretation by Khāja Tūsī with a Focus on Ishārāt wa Tanbīhāt / Muhammad Hadi Tawakkuli and Ali Shirwani p٤٩
- An Inquiry into Reason and Rationality and its Self-Sufficiency in the Philosophers’ View with an Emphasis on Answering the Doubts of the Opponents of Philosophy / Muhammad Sarbakhshi and Ali-Reza Tajik p ٦٣
- A Study and Review of Descartes’ Arguments for Essential Dualism / Muhammad Kazem Reza-Zade Judi p ٨٣
- Methodology of Negating Method in Gadamer’s Philosophical Hermeneutics / Muhammad Hussein Mukhtari and Mahdi Sarlak p ١٠٧
- A Speculation on Mathematical Induction / Lutfullāh Nabawī and Ali Bigdelī p ١٢٩
Shaykh Ishraq and the Problem of Mental Existence
Fatima Husseini Mujarrad
Reza Akbariyan
ABSTRACT
Shaykh Ishraq is among the proponents of the theory of mental existence
and has offered argumentations for it. He acknowledges the distinction
between the world of subject and the world of object as well as the
existence of intelligible forms in the mind; but the intelligible form,
for him, is not the criterion for perception and intellection.
understanding realities, for Suhrawardi, is realized through direct and
immediate intuition of the soul, which he calls ‘the illuminative
knowledge’. For him, then, the criterion for understanding is the
illuminative knowledge of the soul; and the intelligible form, which is
formed in mind along with illuminative knowledge and is an ideal being,
is considered secondary and subordinate. The soul gains knowledge of
objects through illuminative knowledge and, based on the argument
offered by Suhrawardi, it is at this moment that the form of the object
is realized in mind. Therefore, Suhrawardi’s belief in mental existence
is not incoherent with illuminative knowledge, and they may be
reconciled.
KEY WORDS: mental existence, intelligible, illuminative knowledge, Suhrawardi.
The Imagination Faculty and Imaginative Perception in
Ibn Sina and Suhrawardi
Meytham Razmgir
Sayyid Muhammad Intezam
ABSTRACT
What is the function of imagination faculty among other cognitive
faculties? Is imaginative perception a material entity, related to the
world of sensible objects, or an immaterial one? Ibn Sina and Suhrawardi
introduce the imagination faculty as one of the inner faculties, and
imagination as one of the stages in perception. In the present article,
first we state the cosmological and psychological bases of Ibn Sina’s
view. He poses the imagination faculty in his own Peripatetic school of
thought. He regards the imagination faculty as one holding in itself the
forms existing in the common sense, and limits – in the course of
imaginative perception – fantasy to the sensible world. We, then, will
state the cosmological and functionalist bases of Suhrawardi.
Suhrawardi, discusses the imagination faculty within the framework of an
Illuminative school of thought. He, like Ibn Sina, regards it a
material faculty; but he does not accept, in the course of imaginative
perception, Ibn Sina’s theory, and regards the forms perceived in the
imagination faculty as forms just appeared in the imagination faculty.
For him, we have another world apart from the material world wherein the
reality of everything exists, and in the course of imaginative
perception, the forms existing in that world appear in the imagination
faculty. He calls it ‘the world of ideas’ (pendent forms).
At the end, we will deal with the common points and differences between these two philosophers.
KEY WORDS: imagination faculty, imaginative
perception, the world of ideas, abstract, material, soul, inner
faculties, material
world.
Investigating the Problem of Universals in Ibn Sina’s View and Its Interpretation by Khāja Tūsī with a Focus on Ishārāt wa Tanbīhāt
Muhammad Hadi Tawakkuli
Ali Shirwani
ABSTARCT
In the first pages of ‘theology’ in his Ishārāt, Avicenna claims that
we may find out an abstract non-sensible thing through investigating the
sensible things. By superimposing mixed quiddity over the
non-conditioned quiddity, he argues that non-conditioned quiddity is
free from the material accidents of mixed quiddities, hence
non-sensible. This leads to misunderstanding that he regards the
non-conditioned quiddity as existing out of the mind; thus, Khwāja Tūsī,
unlike some of his books that regard general entities out of mind as
impossible, in interpreting Avicenna’s statement says that
non-conditioned quiddity, while non-sensible, is out of mind. This is in
spite of the fact that Avicenna, based on his other books, regards
general entities existing only in mind. It seems that in Ishārāt,
Avicenna is seeking to prove that general entity in mind, i.e.
non-conditioned quiddity in mind, is an abstract entity; thus, he prove
an abstract being.
KEY WORDS: general, intellective soul, abstract, sensible, Avicenna, Khwāja Tūsī.
An Inquiry into Reason and Rationality and its Self-Sufficiency in the Philosophers’ View with an Emphasis on Answering the Doubts of the Opponents of Philosophy
Muhammad Sarbakhshi
Ali-Reza Tajik
ABSTRACT
The contrast between philosophical intellect and religious intellect as
well as the denial of philosophical intellectuality are among the new
discussions dealt with by some authors in the sphere of religious
thought. Self-sufficiency of philosophical intellect and its slavery in
the hands of philosophical rules of the ancient Greece are among other
doubts casted upon philosophy. No proper understanding of the meaning of
intellect and intellectuality in Islamic philosophy and insufficient
acquaintance with pure thoughts of that philosophy are among the main
reasons for such misunderstandings. The present article reviews the
meanings of these terms in original texts of Islamic philosophy to
answer the abovementioned objections and doubts.
KEY WORDS: intellect, intellectuality, religious intellect, philosophical intellect, self-sufficiency of intellect.
A Study and Review of Descartes’ Arguments for Essential Dualism
Muhammad Kazem Reza-Zade Judi
ABSTRACT
According to the theory of essential dualism, human being is composed
of two different essences, i.e. soul or non-physical mind, and physical
body, which are essentially divergent. The best-known contemporary
expositor and proponent of this theory is Rene Descartes. He has given
this theory a new life and formulated numerous arguments for it
including language usage, behavioral creativity, methodical doubt,
distinctive sensory perception, and the indivisibility of soul.
In this article, we have first clearly explained those arguments, and
criticized them. In addition, some objections are mentioned, with which
essential dualism, in general, is faced.
KEY WORDS: Descartes, mental essence, physical essence, awareness, thinking, distinction of soul and body, dimensions.
Methodology of Negating Method in Gadamer’s Philosophical Hermeneutics
Muhammad Hussein Mukhtari
Mahdi Sarlak
ABSTRACT
Philosophical hermeneutics is one of the most important hermeneutical
approaches founded and explained by Martin Heidegger, and formulated and
developed by Hans-George Gadamer. In his best-known work in
hermeneutics entitled Truth and Method, Gadamer, who was a special
disciple to Heidegger, analyzed and broadly reviewed the theory of
methodical hermeneutics. Methodical hermeneutics attempts to present
principles, rules and methodology of correct interpretation of texts.
Gadamer, however, based his hermeneutics on negating methods and
phenomenology of existential understanding, and presented dialectic
understanding based on his hermeneutical principles.
The present article describes and analyses the way Gadamer based his
philosophical hermeneutics on negating methods so that it can explain
“dialectic understanding based on question and answer” as Gadamer’s
alternate method in negating methods, and also it can provide an
opportunity to investigate that method. In this way, it will be
clarified that his model suffers from many drawbacks such as ambiguity
and vicious circle.
KEY WORDS: hermeneutics, philosophical hermeneutics, Gadamer, method, methodology.
A Speculation on Mathematical Induction
Lutfullāh Nabawī
Ali Bigdelī
ABSTRACT
One of the important principles used in proving some of the basic
propositions in new logic as well as many propositions in mathematics is
‘mathematical induction’. The question is whether this principle is an
axiomatic one. Apparently, common sense does not prove it as axiomatic.
Thus, the clarity of the demonstration for propositions based on the
above principle is doubtful, and the justification of such
demonstrations is contingent upon acknowledging the accuracy of the
principle of mathematical induction. The authors think that the above
principle is provable by relying on primary notions and principles
governing the set of natural numbers; and thus by proving it, the
probable concern about the doubt on logical strength of the principle of
mathematical induction and the propositions based on it in new logic is
removed.
KEY WORDS: natural numbers, set, mathematical induction.